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A TAXONOMY OF DISCRETION: REFINING  
THE LEGALITY DEBATE ABOUT OBAMA’S 
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION 
MICHAEL KAGAN
*
 
 On November 21, 2014, President Obama ordered a package of 
immigration policy reforms by the Department of Homeland Security and 
Department of Justice, including promises of work permits for parents of 
children who are U.S. citizens or legal residents.
1
 The November 
announcements expanded a program the president announced in 2012, 
known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), through 
which certain young immigrants may request two-year promises of 
deferred action and employment authorization.
2
 Even before that, 
President Obama’s Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
John Morton issued memoranda (known as the Morton Memos) 
summarizing factors that immigration enforcement officers should use in 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
3
  
 With legislative immigration reform stymied in Congress, broad 
executive action has been the Obama administration’s signature 
contribution to American immigration policy. The centerpiece of Obama’s 
immigration actions has been expanded use of “deferred action” policies 
by which the Department of Homeland Security promises to refrain from 
seeking the deportation of certain people and offers them authorization to 
seek employment. The Obama administration has also made much more 
transparent how it categorizes and prioritizes noncitizens for immigration 
enforcement purposes. The result is that many immigrants who are 
unlawfully present according to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
 
 
 * Michael Kagan (B.A. Northwestern University, J.D. University of Michigan Law School). The 
author is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of 
Law. Special thanks to Prof. Christopher J. Walker for helpful suggestions; all errors are mine.  
 1. Fixing Our Broken Immigration System Through Executive Action—Key Facts, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
 2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration. 
 3. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to 
agency personnel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 
17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to 
agency personnel, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf 
[hereinafter, collectively, Morton Memos]. 
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(INA) now can secure the opportunity to work legally and receive written 
promises that the government has no immediate intention of seeking their 
removal. 
 Since the president had no new Congressional authorization to take 
these measures, his actions drew immediate objections from Republican 
lawmakers.
4
 A few lawmakers, joined by at least one prominent 
immigration law scholar, have cited the president’s actions on immigration 
as potential grounds for impeachment.
5
 Within less than two months of the 
president’s announcement, two federal district courts had reached opposite 
conclusions about whether the president’s policies should be ruled 
unconstitutional by the judiciary.
6
 Meanwhile, a coalition of 26 states has 
filed a complaint in another federal district court challenging the 
president’s constitutional authority to implement the new policies and 
alleging that the president is acting to unilaterally change or suspend the 
law.
7
 
 Some legal scholars allege that the president’s executive actions 
indicate a refusal to faithfully execute the law as required by the 
Constitution.
8
 By contrast, the White House and a number of immigration 
 
 
 4. See, e.g., Eric Bradner & Jedd Rosche, Republicans Hammer Legal Case Against Obama on 
Immigration, CNN.COM (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/20/politics/republican-
response-obama-immigration-speech/; Erin Kelly, Congress Responds to Obama with Bitter Partisan 
Split, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/20/ 
immigration-executive-action-congressional-reaction-boehner/70031622/. 
 5. See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, White House Taking Impeachment Seriously, THE HILL (July 25, 
2014), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/213329-white-house-gop-might-try-to-impeach; Ahiza 
Garcia, GOPer: Impeachment ‘a Possibility’ if Obama Moves Ahead on Immigration, TALKING 
POINTS MEMO (Nov. 10, 2014), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/joe-barton-impeach-obama-
immigration; Andrew C. McCarthy, Amnesty and Impeachment, NAT’L REVIEW ONLINE (Nov. 8, 
2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/392345/amnesty-and-impeachment-andrew-c-mccarthy; 
Peter H. Schuck, Why Congress Can Impeach Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/opinion/the-impeachment-of-obama-on-immigration-may-be-
legal-but-its-wrong.html?_r=0 (immigration scholar arguing that Obama’s actions are illegal); Katie 
Zezima, Obama Action on Immigration Should Spark Impeachment Talk, GOP Lawmaker Says, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/08/03/ 
obama-action-on-immigration-should-spark-impeachment-talk-gop-lawmaker-says/. 
 6. See United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779–797 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (in a case 
concerning a criminal conviction, concluding that the Obama policies are unconstitutional). Compare 
Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 208 n.12 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2014) (disputing the Juarez-Escobar 
decision on jurisdictional grounds and defending the norm of prosecutorial discretion).  
 7. See Complaint, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00254, 2014 WL 6806231 (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 3, 2014); Press Release, Attorney General of Texas Ken Paxton, Attorney General Ken Paxton 
Announces Majority of States Now Part of Immigration Lawsuit; Tennessee, Nevada Officially Join 
(Jan 26, 2015), available at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/oagnews/release.php?id=4936.  
 8. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
781 (2013). 
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law scholars have argued that Obama administration is merely exercising 
prosecutorial discretion and that there are many examples of previous 
presidents taking similar actions.
9
 They argue that limited enforcement 
resources and the need to address humanitarian concerns in individual 
cases require such discretion and that such discretion is routinely exercised 
by law enforcement agencies.  
 Both sides of this debate fail to account for the variety of actions that 
the Obama administration has undertaken without obtaining Congressional 
approval and the different legal issues that arise with each type. Because 
backers of executive action have focused on precedents from previous 
administrations, their arguments imply that there is nothing substantively 
new about President Obama’s actions. By contrast, claims that the 
president is refusing to enforce the law fail to address the reality that 
executive agencies routinely decide not to enforce laws rigidly in every 
possible case. As a result, the legal debate about the scope of the 
president’s authority to change immigration policy has not fully 
recognized what is actually innovative about the Obama policies, and it 
has not focused with precision on those areas where the president is acting 
within well-established authority and those areas where he has taken 
executive discretion into uncharted territory. 
 This Commentary aims to add new focus to the debate about 
President Obama’s executive actions by defining five different types of 
presidential discretion: Congressionally authorized discretion, discretion to 
not enforce the statute in every case, discretion to authorize employment, 
publicizing nonenforcement policies, and establishing categorical criteria 
for deferred action. Table 1 summarizes this typology, with examples of 
each.  
 
 
 9. See Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief, 1956-Present, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL 1 (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/executive_grants 
_of_temporary_immigration_relief_1956-present_final_5.pdf (“[H]istory books reveal[] that President 
Obama’s action follows a long line of presidents who relied on their executive branch authority to 
address immigration challenges.”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Legal Authorities for DACA and Similar 
Programs (Aug. 24, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/ 
2014/11/17/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/executive%20action%20legal%20points.pdf; Tanya Somanader, 
Here’s What the President is Doing to Fix Our Broken Immigration System, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(Nov. 20, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/20/here-s-what-president-doing-
fix-our-broken-immigration-system (“Every U.S. president since President Eisenhower has used his 
executive authority to address immigration issues.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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TABLE 1: 
TAXONOMY OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION ON 
IMMIGRATION IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
(SELECTIVE EXAMPLES) 
 
TYPE I: Congressionally authorized discretion 
 discretion authorized by statute for narrowly defined categories 
such as asylees, victims of crime with minor marijuana offenses, 
children of domestic violence victims 
 expanded waiver eligibility for certain grounds of inadmissibility 
 
TYPE II: Discretion to not enforce the statute in every case 
 Morton Memo factors (2011–November 20, 2014) 
 Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities (Nov. 20, 2014– )10 
o Priority 1: migrants caught at the border, criminal street 
gang members, convicted felons under state law, 
convicted aggravated felons under federal law, suspected 
terrorists 
o Priority 2: noncitizens convicted of three or more 
misdemeanors or “significant misdemeanors” as defined 
by Department of Homeland Security (among others) 
o Priority 3: other noncitizens issued a removal order after 
Jan. 1, 2014 
 
TYPE III: Discretion to authorize employment 
 beneficiaries of deferred action on an individual basis 
 DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) (2012–2014 two 
year employment authorization; beginning 2015 expanded criteria 
with three-year employment authorization) 
 DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents) (beginning 2015, with promised three-year 
employment authorization)  
 
 
 10. See infra note 55. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/10
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TYPE IV: Publicizing nonenforcement policies 
 release of Morton Memos (2011)11 
 Presidential Remarks on Immigration (DACA announcement) 
(2012) 
 presidential statements on new immigration actions (November 
2014) 
 Department of Homeland Security websites describing 
enforcement and deferred action policies, such as: 
o http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action 
o http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca 
 
TYPE V: Establishing categorical criteria for deferred action 
 DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) 
 DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents) 
 
The Commentary summarizes the distinct legal issues that arise with 
each type of discretion. I have organized them as a continuum of legality 
with Type I and Type II having well-established legal foundations. The 
types at the other end of the spectrum, especially Type V, raise important 
separation of powers questions because they may be construed as a form 
of legislative rulemaking that conflicts with the terms of the INA. To be 
clear, I argue no more than that these types of executive action raise 
important questions about the extent of executive authority. I do not 
actually argue that they go beyond the president’s constitutional powers, 
and I suspect that as implemented so far they are, in fact, permissible. But 
I leave that question for another day. In this essay I suggest simply that the 
debate over President Obama’s immigration actions should be more 
narrowly focused on these types of programs. 
This continuum is depicted in Table 2.  
 
 
 11. Morton Memos, supra note 3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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TABLE 2:  
CONTINUUM OF LEGALITY FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
IMMIGRATION DISCRETION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CLEARLY WITHIN 
EXECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LESS DEFINED OR 
QUESTIONABLE 
AUTHORITY 
  
TYPE I: Congressionally authorized 
discretion 
  
  
TYPE II: Discretion to not enforce the 
statute in every case 
  
  
TYPE III: Discretion to authorize 
employment 
  
  
TYPE IV: Publicizing nonenforcement 
policies 
  
  
TYPE V: Establishing categorical criteria 
for deferred action 
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/10
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TYPE I: CONGRESSIONALLY AUTHORIZED DISCRETION 
There are many parts of immigration law where the INA authorizes an 
executive agency to exercise discretion in order to carry out statutory 
mandates.
12
 Congress has in fact authorized deferred action by name in 
specific situations.
13
 The Obama administration has used such provisions 
to liberalize immigration laws in certain ways. For example, the INA 
imposes three- and ten-year bars on readmission of noncitizens who were 
previously unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180 days 
or more than a year, respectively.
14
 But under the statute, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) has discretion to waive the bar in certain 
cases where it would impose a particular kind of hardship.
15
 In 2012, DHS 
issued new rules allowing noncitizens to apply to these waivers while still 
unlawfully present in the country, preventing applicants from becoming 
trapped abroad when their applications are denied, while also in effect 
making it somewhat easier for certain unauthorized immigrants to obtain a 
visa.
16
 
Because these exercises of discretion are authorized by statute, there is 
little controversy about such decisions being within the powers of the 
executive. But some have made a more ambitious argument that these 
statutory authorizations to use discretion and explicit references to 
deferred action legitimize broader discretionary authority for the 
executive.
17
 This strikes me as a difficult argument to sustain. The narrow 
specificity of these statutory provisions indicates that Congress did not 
want to authorize broader discretion.
18
 By comparison, Canada’s 
immigration statute explicitly gives the minister broad authorization to 
 
 
 12. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012) (providing that the Attorney General may “in his 
discretion” waive inadmissibility for noncitizens convicted of a single offense of marijuana 
possession); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a) (providing that the Attorney General “may permit” voluntary 
departure for certain deportable aliens). Many roles assigned in the statute were re-delegated to DHS 
by subsequent legislation. See infra note 38, and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i) (prescribing a child of a domestic violence victims “is 
eligible for deferred action and work authorization”). 
 14. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II).  
 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). 
 16. See generally Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain 
Immediate Relatives, 77 Fed. Reg. 19901 (Apr. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103). 
 17. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 9 (arguing that Congress’ acknowledgement of the existence 
of deferred action shows the legality of prosecutorial discretion). 
 18. Cf. Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 463, 478 (2012) (explaining 
how Congress has reduced the zones of authorized discretion in the INA since the 1970s). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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allow any immigrant to remain in the country.
19
 The American 
immigration statute does not contain any such explicit grant of broad 
discretionary authority.  
TYPE II: DISCRETION TO NOT ENFORCE THE STATUTE IN EVERY CASE 
When the executive branch decides not to attempt to deport a 
noncitizen who is technically present in violation of the INA, the 
executive must rely on its implicit authority to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion. The most obvious form of prosecutorial discretion is the 
decision not to prosecute at all, and it is not unique to immigration law. 
Police do this as well as prosecutors when they decide not to arrest or cite 
people whom they know are technically in violation of the law. For 
example, most people believe that traffic police will not normally pull 
drivers over for driving just barely over the speed limit.
20
 A common 
justification for nonenforcement is that law enforcement agencies have 
limited resources and must prioritize their work.  
Although the Obama administration has brought new attention to 
deferred action policies, previous research has documented that such 
measures in the field of immigration date back at least to the Nixon 
administration.
21
 Although limited resources are often given as a rationale 
for prioritizing enforcement against some people and not others, 
nonenforcement is also justified by more subjective value judgments. 
There are equitable concerns in individual cases where rigid enforcement 
of the law might seem harsh or cruel.
22
 There are also situations where law 
enforcement agencies may decide that statutes still on the books are out of 
step with new social mores, even if the legislature has not repealed the 
measure.
23
 
 
 
 19. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 25.1–2 (Can.). See also Maria 
A. Fufidio, “You May Say I’m A Dreamer, But I’m Not the Only One”: Categorical Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Its Consequences for US Immigration Law, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 976, 1000 (2013). 
 20. See, e.g., Philip Reed, Top 5 Ways to Get Pulled Over by the Cops, EDMUNDS.COM (Oct. 6, 
2011), http://www.edmunds.com/driving-tips/top-5-ways-to-get-pulled-over-by-the-cops.html. 
 21. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010). 
 22. See id. at 244–245 (observing that prosecutorial discretion is typically justified by both 
resource and humanitarian concerns). 
 23. For instance, even before Lawrence v. Texas, it was actually quite rare for consenting adults 
to be prosecuted under sodomy laws that were still on the books in many states. See generally DALE 
CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012). A similar practice 
may exist in some localities where police and prosecutors decide not to penalize people for low-level 
marijuana usage, even if it is technically still a crime. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/10
  
 
 
 
 
2015] A TAXONOMY OF DISCRETION 1091 
 
 
 
 
Nonenforcement discretion has received broad endorsement by the 
Supreme Court in the context of administrative law, and specifically in the 
context of immigration law. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court found that a 
decision by an agency to not enforce a particular law in a particular case is 
“presumptively unreviewable.”24 In the immigration context, the Court 
found in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee that the 
executive has wide discretion to decide whether to initiate or continue 
deportation proceedings “for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own 
convenience.”25 In 2012, the Court issued its ruling on Arizona’s anti-
immigrant SB 1070 bill shortly after President Obama announced the 
DACA program. The Arizona majority reiterated that “broad discretion” is 
a “principal feature” of the immigration system.26  
The Arizona Court expanded on the necessity for federal officials to 
use discretion as part of its explanation for why states should not be able 
to interfere in federal prerogatives about how immigration laws should be 
enforced: 
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces 
immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support 
their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien 
smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an 
individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the 
alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the 
community, or a record of distinguished military service.
27
  
These considerations endorsed by the Arizona Court provide authority for 
the executive to defer enforcement based on equitable factors, not only 
because of limited resources.
28
 The factors endorsed in Arizona also 
broadly mirror the factors listed as considerations for deferred action in the 
Morton Memos.
29
  
 
 
 24. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 25. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S 471, 484 (1999). 
 26. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. In a dissent in the Arizona decision which was issued by the Supreme Court just a few weeks 
later, Justice Scalia argues that limited resources cannot fully explain the DACA program because the 
government requires resources to process applications for the program. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521–22 
(J. Scalia, dissenting). But applicants are required to pay a filing fee of $380 to U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services to process their applications, plus $85 for biometric security screening. See 
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca# 
filing%20process (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). 
 29. Compare Morton Memos, supra note 3. 
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Even critics of the Obama policies concede that the president has some 
discretionary authority to prioritize enforcement of the law against some 
people and choose nonenforcement with others.
30
 But these judicial 
precedents appear to speak only to the simple decision to refrain from 
taking enforcement action. They do not appear on their texts to deal with 
more affirmative actions, nor to the kinds of categorical rules and 
application procedures that the Obama administration has put into effect. 
Nonenforcement is the absence of an action; it involves the government 
simply deciding not to enforce the law against a certain person. In a strict 
sense, simple nonenforcement does not even require the knowledge of the 
beneficiary.  
Deferred action in immigration typically includes something more 
affirmative: the Notice of Action that is sent to beneficiaries states that the 
Department of Homeland Security “has decided to defer action in your 
case,” which is analogous to a prosecutor telling a suspect that she has 
decided not to press charges at the present time.
31
 The deferred action 
notice indicates that the decision remains in place “unless terminated.”32 
Thus, DACA grants a reprieve, but not a visa. But because the law 
enforcement agency informs the beneficiary of the decision, deferred 
action is conceptually distinct from many other forms of prosecutorial 
discretion. But this distinction does not mean that deferred action goes 
beyond the normal patterns of prosecutorial discretion. Traffic police who 
choose not to pull over every speeder they see do not tell most of the 
violators that they have been allowed a free pass. But police do sometimes 
let violators go with just a warning, and prosecutors do sometimes tell 
potential defendants that the state will not press charges even if legally it 
could sustain a prosecution. 
TYPE III: DISCRETION TO AUTHORIZE EMPLOYMENT 
Under DACA, deferred action notices come with the promise that “an 
Employment Authorization Document (EAD) will arrive separately in the 
mail.”33 This EAD, a credit card-sized identification document, affords the 
right to obtain a Social Security number.
34
 In many states, an EAD can be 
 
 
 30. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 792–94 . 
 31. See Dep’t of Homeland Security I-797 Notice of Action in a deferred action case handled by 
the Thomas & Mack Legal Clinic (on file with author). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.; see also Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 
28.  
 34. See RM 10211.420 Employment Authorization for Non-Immigrants, SOCIAL SECURITY 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/10
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the basis for obtaining a driver’s license or even facilitate professional 
licensure.
35
 While simple nonenforcement of immigration law has a clear 
analogy to prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context, prosecutors do 
not actually issue permits to let people continue to engage in unlawful 
activity. While nonenforcement of the law leaves people essentially as 
they were, the grant of employment authorization leaves them 
substantially better off. Thus, on the surface it appears that the Obama 
administration is granting significant immigration benefits to people who, 
according to statute, are ineligible to even enter the country.
36
 In the words 
of one Republican senator: “I can understand he can prioritize prosecution 
and deportation, and he has, but where does the president get the authority 
to issue work permits for millions of people?”37 
The answer is that Congress gave the executive branch this authority, at 
least implicitly. The INA defines the categories of noncitizens who are 
authorized to be employed differently than the categories of those who are 
permitted to be in the country. The statute defines a noncitizen who is not 
authorized to work as an “alien [who] is not at that time either an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or authorized to be so 
employed by this chapter or by the [Department of Homeland Security].”38 
Thus, the statute implicitly envisions that some noncitizens who are not 
authorized to work by the statute may be so authorized by the executive. 
The regulations that implement this section provide that employment 
authorization may be granted to noncitizens who benefit from deferred 
action.
39
 Thus, the executive branch has the authority to affirmatively 
grant employment authorization because Congress has allowed it to do 
so.
40
  
 
 
ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2014), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0110211420. 
 35. See Access to Driver’s Licenses, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (last visited Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nilc.org/driverlicenses.html.  
 36. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining classes of excludable noncitizens).  
 37. Cindy Saine, GOP Vows to Counter Obama on Immigration, VOICE OF AMERICA (Nov. 20, 
2014), http://www.voanews.com/content/republicans-obama-immigration-reform/2528477.html 
(quoting Sen. John Cornyn of Texas). 
 38. 8 U.S.C § 1324a(h)(3) (emphasis added). The text of the statute refers to authorization “by 
the Attorney General,” who previously supervised the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 
When the INS was abolished in 2002, Congress transferred these functions to the Department of 
Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. § 1103. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (“It is unlawful for a person or 
other entity to hire . . . for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an 
unauthorized alien (as defined in subsection (h)(3) of this section).”). 
 39. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(11) (2014); 8 C.F.R § 274a.12(c)(14). 
 40. The lack of strict statutory regulation about which noncitizens may legally work is consistent 
with the overall policy orientation of the INA. Congress opted to focus deterrence of illegal 
employment of immigrants against employers, not the immigrants themselves. See Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). While the statute prohibits employers from 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In the context of the taxonomy that I am presenting here, there would 
be reasonable grounds to consider the authorization of employment a 
variety of Type I discretion, given that it is authorized by statute. But I 
have categorized it separately because the statute is less explicit about 
employment authorization than it is about other specific exercises of 
discretion. The statute clearly envisions executive authority to authorize 
employment in some cases, but it is not clear that Congress ever imagined 
that this authority would be used to grant employment authorization to 
large numbers of people who, according to the statute, should not be in the 
country. Administrative law permits the executive to reasonably interpret 
ambiguous statutes through regulations.
41
  
The wide availability of employment authorization under the Obama 
deferred action programs is within the explicit terms of the regulation. 
Nevertheless, Congress did not authorize such programs with the clarity 
through which it authorized other types of discretion, and it would be a 
stretch to suggest that Congress meant to do so. In the type of discretion at 
issue here, the executive is relying on the ambiguity of a statute rather than 
on a clear delegation of power from Congress. Since there is a reasonable 
argument to be made that the administration is going beyond 
Congressional intentions, this type of discretion is on somewhat more 
tenuous legal grounds than Type I. 
TYPE IV: PUBLICIZING NONENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
 While nonenforcement discretion has been a part of immigration 
policy for many decades, one of the Obama administration’s most 
important innovations in the area of immigration discretion has been its 
decision to publish its nonenforcement policies. Previous administrations 
had devoted considerable efforts to keeping their immigration enforcement 
policies shielded from public scrutiny.
42
 Public knowledge that such 
policies even existed came about through the high-profile deportation case 
in the 1970s involving John Lennon and ensuing Freedom of Information 
Act litigation by his attorney, Leon Wildes.
43
 In 2007, the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Ombudsman 
 
 
hiring unauthorized workers, Congress chose not to explicitly prohibit or penalize unauthorized 
immigrants for seeking or accepting employment, so long as they do not do so by fraud. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(a); Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 41. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 42. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE 
L.J. 458, 510–30 (2009) (showing that presidential discretion is usually not subject to public scrutiny). 
 43. See Wadhia, supra note 21, at 246–52. 
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recommended publishing “basic information on deferred action,” 
including criteria and instructions on how to apply, but the Bush-era 
USCIS director declined, citing the discretionary and “case-by-case” 
nature of the program.
44
  
 This approach rapidly changed after President Obama took office. In 
June 2009, the Obama administration published a press release 
announcing that it would grant deferred action to certain children and 
spouses of deceased U.S. citizens.
45
 In 2011, the Morton Memos were 
made available to the public.
46
 When the president initiated DACA, he 
announced it in a televised speech in the White House Rose Garden.
47
 In 
November 2014, the president’s announcement of new executive actions 
was accompanied by immediate publication of at least 12 memoranda and 
additional fact sheets providing information about how the administration 
would exercise discretion going forward.
48
 To be clear, it is not new that 
immigration agencies have guidelines about how they should exercise 
discretion.
49
 Rather, what is new since 2009 is that federal immigration 
agencies publicly announced and disseminated these guidelines.  
 There are good reasons to conclude that this new transparency may be 
beneficial to democracy. Before she was on the Supreme Court, Elena 
Kagan argued that presidents should use the power of regulatory agencies 
to achieve policy goals because they can be subject to political 
accountability through elections.
50
 But she noted that this political 
accountability could only function if the president’s politics are disclosed 
to the public.
51
 From this perspective, the launch of the DACA program 
was particularly laudable, because the president announced it in a Rose 
Garden ceremony during an election year, debated it with his opponent, 
and won re-election.  
 There is certainly room for objections. Disseminating such 
information to the public may have the downside of eliminating any 
deterrent effect that may come from leaving the public guessing about how 
 
 
 44. Id. at 262–63. 
 45. Id. at 263. 
 46. See Morton Memos, supra note 3. 
 47. Remarks by the President on Immigration, supra note 2. 
 48. See Fixing Our Broken Immigration System Through Executive Action—Key Facts, supra 
note 1, and accompanying links.  
 49. Wadhia, supra note 21, at 246–52. 
 50. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2369 (2001). 
 51. Id. (“The President's involvement, at least if publicly disclosed, vests the action with an 
increased dose of accountability, which although not (by definition) peculiarly legislative in nature, 
renders the action less troublesome than solely bureaucratic measures from the standpoint of 
democratic values.”). 
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the government decides whom to target for enforcement.
52
 Announcing 
that the law will not be enforced against certain people might appear to be 
a means for an executive to unilaterally rewrite the law. Nevertheless, 
policy disagreements about whether to make discretion criteria public can 
be resolved through the political process. If the president is within his 
authority to decide not to rigidly enforce the law against every person, it is 
difficult to see why he would be prohibited from informing the public how 
he intends to use this discretion.  
TYPE V: ESTABLISHING CATEGORICAL CRITERIA FOR DEFERRED ACTION 
 The Morton Memos set out a long list of factors favoring and 
disfavoring enforcing immigration law in different cases, but they are 
ambiguous about how these conflicting factors should be weighted in a 
specific case.
53
 The Morton Memos purport only to guide enforcement 
priorities, and state that ICE officers “may exercise discretion.”54 They do 
not require it.
55
 But where the Morton Memos were open-ended, DACA’s 
criteria are specific and unambiguous. For DACA, USCIS set up a website 
and application procedure that looks much like those that the agency has 
established for visa programs that are authorized by statute.
56
 Various 
sources have called this “class-based” or “categorical” discretion.57 This 
seems to be the pattern that USCIS is likely to follow with the new 
deferred action program for parents of U.S. citizen children and legal 
residents. 
 DACA may represent the first time that federal immigration 
authorities established a formal application procedure for a purely 
 
 
 52. Cf. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (making an exception for information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, if disclosure would increase the rate of law breaking by 
revealing law enforcement strategies and guidelines). 
 53. See Morton Memos, supra note 3. 
 54. Id. 
 55. November 2014 revisions of the Morton Memos make this emphatic: see Memorandum from 
Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., for Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting 
Dir., U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, et al. 5 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www. 
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf (“Nothing in this 
memorandum should be construed to prohibit or discourage the apprehension, detention, or removal of 
aliens unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as priorities herein.”). 
 56. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 28.  
 57. See, e.g., The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens 
Unlawfully Present in the U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, slip op. O.L.C. at 15, 18, 20, 33 (Nov. 
19, 2014) [hereinafter “OLC opinion”], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf (referring to “class-
based deferred action” and to the “categorical variety” of deferred action).  
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discretionary form of deferred action that has no specific statutory basis.
58
 
Because it involves clear criteria and a set procedure with little room for 
case-by-case decision making, the DACA program appears to have “the 
hallmarks of a statement of law.”59 If DACA had been issued in order to 
apply an ambiguous statutory provision, it probably would have required a 
notice and comment process because it bears the characteristics of a 
legislative rule under the Administrative Procedures Act.
60
 In fact, some 
have argued that deferred action policies should be enforceable in court, 
on the theory that issuing detailed policy guidance strips these programs of 
their discretionary character.
61
  
 Matters of discretion are not typically subject to judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.
62
 But there is another important 
distinction at the heart of DACA. Immigration agencies often issue 
detailed rules governing the administration of a visa program that is 
authorized by statute.
63
 These situations often call for discretion—what I 
have called Type I discretion—because it is explicitly required and 
authorized by Congress. But what makes DACA distinctive is that it is not 
based on any statutory provision at all.
64
 DACA’s beneficiaries are people 
who are inadmissible and/or deportable according to the explicit terms of 
the statute.
65
 Thus, the strongest criticism of DACA is that by writing 
categorical rules that benefit people who are excluded by statute, President 
Obama is acting in defiance of the law rather than exercising discretion 
about how to apply the law.
66
  
 The quasi-legislative character of the DACA rules does bring 
prosecutorial discretion into uncharted constitutional territory. By 
unilaterally establishing a new immigration program, complete with 
 
 
 58. See Mike Warley, Note, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Case of Prosecutorial 
Discretion or Inappropriate Agency Rulemaking?, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 683, 685 (2012). 
 59. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 844–45. 
 60. See Warley, supra note 58, at 695–706. 
 61. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the 
Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 57–63 
(2013) (arguing that deferred action decisions may be judicially reviewable under the Administrative 
Procedures Act). Cf. Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of 
Oscar Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR 437 (2013) (describing the failure to apply Morton Memo criteria in a 
particular case). 
 62. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).  
 63. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (establishing rules to implement the U Visa). 
 64. Instead of a notice and comment process, when USCIS established an application procedure 
for DACA, it published a “30-Day Notice of Information Collection Under Review” to solicit 
comments on the proposed process. Comment Request, 77 Fed. Reg. 49451 (Aug. 16, 2012). 
 65. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (an alien present without being admitted or paroled is 
inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (an alien present in violation of the INA is deportable). 
 66. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 844–45. 
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specific criteria and a formal application procedure, the Obama 
administration has made Congressional action somewhat less necessary to 
achieve its policy goals.
67
 Perhaps this is a power that the president has 
always had. In Heckler, the Supreme Court suggested in a footnote that 
there is some threshold at which an executive’s exercise of discretion 
becomes “so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities.”68 The Court has also warned that presidential power is 
“at its lowest ebb” if the executive takes actions that are “incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”69 The trouble is that we 
do not know where or how to draw the line between nonenforcement that 
is a natural consequence of prosecutorial discretion and nonenforcement 
that is so prescribed that it amounts to an executive rewriting of the law. 
 The seriousness of these concerns is illustrated by the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s (OLC) review of the November 2014 executive actions.70 OLC 
signaled that “class-based” deferred action programs posed a particular 
problem unless they incorporate an individualized, case-by-case review 
with room to deviate from general rules in individual cases.
71
 OLC 
blocked a proposed deferred action program for parents of DACA 
recipients, while permitting one for parents of U.S. citizens, on the theory 
that Congress has in the past shown an inclination to approve interim 
deferred action for noncitizens who will eventually become eligible for a 
visa.
72
 Under current law, U.S. citizens can sponsor their parents once they 
turn 21; by contrast, DACA recipients have no legal right to remain the 
country and cannot sponsor another person.
73
 However, this attempt to 
draw a limit on deferred action is subject to at least two major objections. 
First, a program is not authorized by Congress because previous 
Congresses have authorized similar programs.
74
 Second, not all 
 
 
 67. Cf. OLC opinion, supra note 57, at 6 (“[T]he Executive cannot, under the guise of exercising 
enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences.”). 
 68. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).  
 69. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (J. Jackson, concurring).  
 70. OLC opinion, supra note 57. 
 71. Id. at 18 n.8, 22–23. 
 72. Id. at 29, 32. 
 73. Id. Compare Steve Legomsky, Why Can't Deferred Action Be Given to Parents of the 
Dreamers?, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014) http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/why-cant-deferred-
action-be-given-to.html (arguing that DACA and deferred action for parents of DACA recipients can 
be justified on humanitarian grounds). 
 74. Cf. Adam Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, Executive Discretion and Congressional Priorities, 
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 21, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/executive-discretion-and-
congressional.html (commending in part OLC’s search for implicit Congressional priorities, but 
casting doubt on whether such priorities can be clearly discerned from the INA). 
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beneficiaries of Obama’s deferred action programs will ever be eligible for 
visas under current law.
75
 Most DACA beneficiaries never will.
76
  
 The strained reasoning by which OLC justified DACA and newly 
expanded deferred action should be a warning for advocates of such 
policies. Executive discretion cannot be limitless. Some line must be 
drawn, even if OLC did not draw the line coherently.
77
 The central defense 
of President Obama’s actions has been that the executive has inherent 
authority to use discretion to reflect resource and humanitarian realities. 
But these rationales apply more easily to simple nonenforcement. By 
contrast, specifically defining beneficiaries and establishing an application 
procedure create more danger of the executive usurping the role of the 
legislature. This is the type of discretion that deserves the most focused 
debate. 
CONCLUSION 
By one view, DACA is an illegal action, signaled by the fact that OLC 
could not articulate a coherent rationale for its existence. But it is also 
possible that OLC was overly cautious. It may be that the Obama 
immigration actions are all defensible simply because they grant such 
tenuous rights, if that is even the right word. At their core, they simply 
provide an unenforceable promise not to deport.
78
 It is also important to 
note that the Administration can make a strong case that it has enforced 
immigration law energetically, deporting record numbers of noncitizens.
79
 
Thus, President Obama cannot be seriously accused of abdicating 
responsibility to enforce immigration law.
80
 Moreover, many aspects of 
 
 
 75. See also OLC opinion, supra note 57, at 19 n.14. 
 76. See Ahilan Arulanantham, Two Rationales for Administrative Relief, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 
21, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/two-rationales-for-administrative-relief.html (noting 
that the OLC rationale seems to cast doubt on DACA itself); David A. Martin, Concerns About a 
Troubling Presidential Precedent and OLC’s Review of Its Validity, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014) 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/concerns-about-troubling-presidential.html (same). 
 77. See Martin, supra note 76 (“It’s almost as though OLC felt it had to draw a line in the legal 
sand somewhere or else there would be no end to the pressures on the executive branch to add new 
groups to the deferred action list.”). 
 78. Cf. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(affirming, under the theory of plenary power, the government’s decision to revoke a promise to re-
admit a Chinese person who had left the country expecting to be able to return).  
 79. See JOHN F. SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 6 Fig. 2 (Sept. 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. 
 80. Cf. David. A. Martin, A Lawful Step for the Immigration System, WASH. POST (June 24, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-lawful-step-for-the-immigration-system/2012/06/ 
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Obama’s executive actions on immigration law stand on solid legal 
foundations. But President Obama has done some things that are new, 
particularly in terms of announcing his prosecutorial discretion policies, 
and in establishing specific eligibility criteria and a formal application 
process. These measures take discretion into uncharted constitutional 
territory, and these are the areas on which the debate about the legality of 
the president’s executive actions on immigration should be focused. 
 
 
24/gJQAgT0O0V_story.html (arguing that the President must maintain a high level of immigration 
enforcement because Congress has appropriated funds to do so). 
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